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INTRODUCTION
In his review of our book The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice, Sunstein (2013) questions our ideological rankings of Supreme Court justices from 1937 to 2009 (see Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, table 3 .2) on two grounds. One is that justices who sit on the Court in different time periods face a different mixture of cases, so that simply tallying up the fraction of conservative or liberal votes in nonunanimous cases from different time periods to generate an ideological ranking of justices is problematic. For example, it would be incorrect to conclude that Justice Thomas, just because he voted conservatively in 81 percent of the cases compared with Chief lee epstein is the Ethan E. A. Shepley Distinguished University Professor at Washington University. william m. landes is the Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law School. richard a. posner is a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. We thank William Hubbard and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. Justice Burger's 79 percent, is more conservative than Burger was; they voted on different cases. In contrast, a comparison between Thomas (81 percent conservative) and Kennedy (65 percent conservative) is proper because the two justices have sat together since 1991 and throughout this period have voted on the same cases except in the few instances in which one of them was recused. 1 Sunstein's other objection is to weighting all observations equally, as we did-treating all votes as fungible. As he says, "It is one thing to vote to uphold a particular restriction on abortion: it is quite another to overrule Roe v. Wade. The 'percentage of conservative votes' metric will not pick up such differences" (Sunstein 2013, p. 56 ). Sunstein's second objection holds even when we rank justices who, because they overlapped in service on the Court, voted on the same cases during the period of overlap. Suppose that in their overlap period two justices both voted conservatively in 70 percent of the cases, but one voted conservatively in 90 percent of the important cases and the other in only 75 percent of those cases. A conclusion that the two justices were equally conservative would be unsound.
To evaluate Sunstein's first criticism, Section 2 of this paper develops an index of conservative votes (analogous to a consumer price index) that allows us to rank justices across different time periods, holding constant a conservative index that implicitly adjusts for differences in the case mixture and other factors (such as changes in the fraction of conservative decisions in the lower courts from which the cases the justices vote on come) that may cause justices to be coded as voting more or less conservatively over different time periods even if their ideology has not changed. This allows us to adjust our ideology ranking to meet Sunstein's criticism.
In Section 3 we respond to Sunstein's second criticism by developing ideological rankings based on justices' votes in only the most significant and controversial cases. Instead of treating votes in all nonunanimous cases equally (after making the Section 2 adjustment), we base our rankings on votes in 5-4 and 6-3 decisions and compare the justices' votes in these cases with their votes in the other nonunanimous decisions. We experiment with an alternative measure of importance as well-cases reported in the New York Times.
1. Kennedy was appointed to the Court in 1987 and thus served four terms before Thomas's appointment. If we confine our attention to Kennedy's votes to the same terms as Thomas (1991 Thomas ( -2012 , he voted conservatively 62 percent of the time.
ADJUSTED IDEOLOGY RANKINGS
On the basis of studies by other students of the Supreme Court, our book identified 11 justices in the 1937-2009 terms as moderates: Hughes, Owen Roberts, Frankfurter, Byrnes, Jackson, Whittaker, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell and O'Connor (Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013, p. 115) . Our use of the word "moderate" may mislead, however, as it suggests a justice who has no strong ideological preference, so although each of his or her votes will be classified as either conservative or liberal (because these are the only two classifications in the Spaeth Supreme Court database), his or her total votes will be more evenly divided than the total votes of liberal and conservative justices. Thus, for example, the percentage of votes classified as conservative in the Spaeth database of Supreme Court cases for the relevant terms is significantly lower for moderates (60.4 percent) than for conservatives (71.6 percent) but significantly higher than for liberals (25.1 percent). One reason for such swings is that the identities of justices that make up the conservative, moderate and liberal wings of the Court change over time as justices retire or (rarely nowadays) die and are replaced. Since not all conservatives are equally conservative, all liberals equally conservative or all moderates equally conservative, changes in the composition of the groups will lead to changes in voting behavior-as will (a second reason) changes in the mixture of cases from term to term. It seems unlikely that such large changes in voting behavior over a 6-10-year period would result from shifts in the ideology of the justices composing each group rather than from other factors such as changes in the character of the cases decided by the Court, though those changes could be the result of changes in the justices' ideology, since they choose what cases to hear from the thousands of cases they are asked to hear.
terms (eight of the justices became more liberal, and four became more conservative), these changes were gradual and cannot explain the substantial term-to-term changes shown in Figure 1 . , 1937-2012 We explore these issues by regressing the vote of each justice in each case on a set of dummy variables for each justice. We are particularly interested in the R 2 (or adjusted R 2 ), which tells us what fraction of the variance in votes can be explained by knowing the identity of the individual justice or his ideological group or both, and 1 − R 2 , which tells us the fraction that can be explained by other factors taken together, such as the nature of the cases, the lower-court decisions in them and the identities of the parties. Estimating separate regressions for conservative, moderate and liberal justices, we find that only 5.0 percent of the variation in votes by conservatives, 2.2 percent by moderates and 1.9 percent by liberals depends on the identity of the individual justice. If we combine all justices into a single regression, the identity-of-the-justice variable explains 19.5 percent of the variation in votes, of which 17.0 percent (87 percent of 19.5 percent) is explained by whether the justice is a conservative, moderate or liberal.
Figure 1. Fraction of conservative votes in nonunanimous cases
If we assume that moderate justices are at most weakly ideological, that each moderate's ideology is roughly constant over his tenure and that their ideology as a group does not change as the identity of the moderates change over time, we can use their voting behavior as a benchmark to create an adjusted voting index for each justice that by controlling for the influence of nonideological factors (for example, changes in the characteristics of cases) can pinpoint the ideological differences among justices. To understand the approach, imagine two conservative justices who sat on the Court in nonoverlapping periods: Justice A voted conservatively 80 percent of the time in period 1, and Justice B voted conservatively 65 percent of the time in period 2. One might conclude that this shows that A was more conservative than B. But suppose that same group of moderates voted conservatively 70 percent of the time in period 1 but only 50 percent of the time in period 2. This would imply that something, most likely the nonideological characteristics of the cases heard by the Court, had changed significantly between the two periods, which caused the same moderates to vote less conservatively in the second period. 4 If we adjust A's and B's votes for the voting of the moderates, by setting the moderate index equal to 1 during A's tenure and to .71 during B's tenure, the adjusted fraction of conservative votes for A is still 80 percent (.80/1), but for B it is now 91.5 percent (.65/.71). Thus B is seen to be more conservative than A after adjustment is made for nonideological factors that caused moderates to vote 20 percent more conservatively during A's than B's tenure.
5
Let us consider the evidence that supports our using the votes of moderates as a benchmark to create an adjusted voting index that allows us to compare the ideologies of justices who served in different time periods. The evidence is as follows.
Trend in Moderates' Voting. Figure 1 shows no significant trend in the voting (fraction of conservative votes) of moderates over the terms. The absence of a trend implies that changes in the number and composition of the justices that make up the moderate group and even possible ideological changes for a given moderate over his tenure have no significant effects on the voting of moderates taken as a group. We test this hypothesis by estimating a least-squares regression in which the dependent variable is the fraction of conservative votes of moderates each term (the variable along the vertical axis in Figure 1 ) and the independent variables are a linear time trend and the number of moderate justices in 5. The method of creating an adjusted fraction of conservative votes is as follows. First we calculated the percentage of conservative votes in nonunanimous cases for moderate justices in each term. We set their average value (60.4 percent) equal to 1 and then calculated an index for each term t equal to the percentage of conservative votes for moderates in t divided by 60.4. For example, because moderates voted conservatively 74.4 percent of the time in 1970, our index has a value of 1.23 (74.4/60.4) in 1970, which implies that the case mix and other nonideological factors generated a 23 percent increase in the percentage of conservative votes. We then deflated the percentage of conservative votes by conservative, liberal and moderate justices in 1970 by 23 percent. By repeating this procedure each year, we are able to construct an adjusted index of the percentage of conservative votes that holds constant changes in nonideological factors that influence the justice's vote independent of ideology. We made a further adjustment for the fact that there have been no moderates on the Court since O'Connor left in 2005 (and she voted in only seven nonunanimous cases in that year). Using a sample consisting of all nonunanimous votes of moderate justices from 1937 to 2005, we regressed the direction of the vote (conservative or liberal) on the lower-court outcome (conservative or liberal). Since the Court typically takes cases to reverse the lower-court decision, the regression coefficient on the lower-court variable is negative and highly significant. We used this regression to predict how a hypothetical moderate would have voted in 2005-12 and then adjusted the votes of all justices starting in 2005 for the moderate index, which now covers the 2005-12 terms. Notice finally that in a few instances in Tables 1 and 2 the adjusted fraction of conservative votes for a justice is slightly greater than 1. In those instances, we set the adjusted fraction of conservative votes equal to 1. each term (which varies from one to four). Neither variable is close to significant, and jointly the two variables are insignificant. In short, the evidence seems overwhelming that year-to-year variations in the fraction of conservative votes for the same group of moderate justices over periods ranging from 6 to 10 years and for O'Connor over a 12-year period reflect changes in case characteristics, not shifts in ideology for individual justices.
Moderates' Ideological Drift. A related concern that could undermine our benchmark is ideological drift for moderate justices. For example, if moderates become more liberal over time, this would lead to a downward drift in the moderate index and an upward adjustment in the fraction of conservative votes for the more recent justices, which would make the latter group appear more conservative and so make a comparison with earlier justices misleading. It turns out, however, that ideological drift has no effect on our results. We noted earlier (see note 3) that there was significant ideological drift for 12 justices. This group includes four moderates: Blackmun and O'Connor became more liberal, while Frankfurter and White became more conservative, which resulted in no net drift.
7 Moreover, the absence of a significant trend in the fraction of conservative votes for moderates in Figure 1 shows that there is no net drift. 7. Following the approach in Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2013), we tested for drift by estimating a regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the justice voted conservatively and zero if the justice voted liberally. The independent variable is the term during which the case is decided. A significant negative The most striking feature of Table 1 is how little our adjustments (designed to eliminate the effect of differences among justices that cannot be ascribed to ideology) alter the ideology findings in our book, with the exception of justices who served during the early years of our sample period. Table 1 shows that the difference between the adjusted and un adjusted fraction of conservative votes is greater than 5 percent for seven justices: McReynolds, Butler, Owen Roberts, Whittaker, Hughes, Brandeis and Stone. Except for Whittaker (who served during the 1956-61 terms), none sat beyond the 1945 term. Notice that our adjustment makes the six justices more conservative than they appear to be from just looking at their unadjusted votes. This is because moderate justices voted less conservatively in the 1937-45 period (50.9 percent) than in the 1946-2005 period (61.7 percent). This implies a 17.5 percent increase (−(50.9 − 61.7)/61.7) in the weight or price of a conservative vote in the earlier period. That in turn increases the adjusted fraction of conservative votes of justices sitting for all or part of the 1937-45 period.
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For Whittaker we find the opposite, however. During his brief tenure coefficient implies liberal drift, and a significant positive coefficient implies conservative drift. Restricting the sample to O'Connor's votes, we find a negative and significant coefficient in the 1981-93 period (a coefficient of −.008 and a t-value of 2.05 with 986 votes in nonunanimous cases) but an insignificant coefficient in the 1994-2005 terms (a coefficient of −.006 and a t-value of .91 with 467 votes in nonunanimous cases). Since O'Connor drifted in the liberal direction, we might have expected a decline in our moderate index starting in the 1994 term because there are no moderates drifting in the opposite direction. This turns out not to be the case because O'Connor's liberal drift took place before 1994.
8. We exclude 2007 votes in subject areas in which we could not classify the outcome as either conservative or liberal (see Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013, chap. 3 app.) : 18 votes that cover one case in interstate disputes and one case in which the issue is listed as unclassified.
9. We exclude Cardozo and Sutherland from the rankings in Table 1 There is virtually no change in the ideology rankings when we substitute the adjusted for the unadjusted numbers, except that McReynolds and Butler jump from 8 and 18 in the unadjusted rankings to 1 and 2 in the adjusted rankings, while Owen Roberts jumps from 13 to 6 and Whittaker falls from 5 to 15. Figure 2 illustrates the closeness in rankings between the adjusted fraction of conservative votes on the vertical axis and the unadjusted fraction on the horizontal axis. (The line in Figure 2 has an intercept equal to 0 and slope equal to 1.) Except for the scatter points representing McReynolds, Butler, Owen Roberts and Whittaker, there are no significant changes in rank among the justices even though many of them served in different periods. The rank-order correlation between the adjusted and unadjusted numbers in Figure 2 is .96, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the slope in the linear regression equals 1 and the constant equals 0.
Rehnquist is generally believed to have become less conservative after he became chief justice. Table 1 provides support for this hypothesis (though we offer a qualification in Section 3). There is a statistically significant decline of .044 in the adjusted fraction of conservative votes by Rehnquist after he became chief justice. The decline is almost entirely the result of his votes in economic cases.
The overall impact on ideology (equivalently, the fraction of conservative votes) of our adjustments in Table 1 is minor except for the six justices (McReynolds, Butler, Owen Roberts, Hughes, Brandeis and Stone, excluding Byrnes, who was a justice only during the 1941 term) who left the Court between 1938 and 1945 and Whittaker, who was a justice in the 1956-61 terms. The average absolute difference between the adjusted and unadjusted fraction of conservative votes is 17.4 percent for these seven justices but only 1.7 percent for the other 36 justices in our sample.
11 And among the latter group, the difference is greater than 4 percent for only three of the justices: Souter and Goldberg (4.0 percent each) and 11. The absolute difference for the 36 justices is 1.7 percent. There are 17 justices for which the difference between the adjusted and unadjusted fraction of conservative votes is negative and 19 for which the difference is positive. Byrnes (4.3 percent). Except for the seven, we find no support for Sunstein's conjecture that changes in the mixture of cases distort the ideology rankings of justices over the past 75 years.
DOES IT MATTER THAT CASES ARE WEIGHTED EQUALLY?
We have now to consider Sunstein's second criticism, which is of the implicit assumption in our book (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013) that cases are fungible ideologically-all conservative votes are equally significant, all liberal votes equally significant, all moderate votes equally significant. He argues that "to rank judges along an ideological spectrum, we want not merely to count votes (liberal or conservative?) but also to weight them, by examining the particular cases and also the relative extremism of the judges' preferred outcome. It is one thing to vote to strike down a particular affirmative action program; it is quite another to say that all affirmative action programs should be struck down" (Sunstein 2013, p. 56) . Suppose that after we have adjusted for differences in case mixture over time, as in Table 1 , we find that Justice A voted conservatively in 70 percent and B in 60 percent of the cases. It seems reasonable to conclude that A is more conservative than B, but this may be wrong. Imagine that B votes more conservatively in the cases that really matter to conservatives (such as abortion rights as compared with Securities and Exchange Commission regulation) than A does, so B really is more conservative than A. We address this problem in two ways. The first compares the fraction of conservative votes in a subset of cases that are likely to be ideologically more divisive than most Supreme Court decisions-namely, cases in which the votes were 5-4-with the fraction of conservative votes in less closely divided nonunanimous cases. We thus use the amount of disagreement among the justices as a proxy (an imperfect one, considering that Brown v. Board of Education was unanimous and Roe v. Wade was 7-2) for the significance or controversiality of a case. (See the Appendix for an example.) Second, we examine cases that receive front-page coverage in the New York Times. We continue to make the adjustment for case mixture that we made in Section 1 on the basis of a voting index for moderate justices. conservatively more than twice as often as Souter and Stevens, who are the next most conservative of the liberal justices. Table 2 also reveals a sharp break in the fraction of conservative voting by justices above and below Blackmun in the conservative index. In 5-4 decisions Blackmun, the least conservative of the moderates, voted conservatively 39 percent of the time, and the justices on either side of him voted conservatively 55 percent and 22 percent of the time, respectively. Overall, 22 of the 29 conservative and liberal justices in our sample become significantly more ideological (conservatives vote more conservatively and liberals vote more liberally) in 5-4 cases than in cases with fewer dissents: 9 of the 13 conservative justices vote significantly more conservatively in 5-4 cases, and 13 of the 16 liberal justices vote significantly more liberally in 5-4 cases. Thomas, Sherman Minton, Clark and Harlan are the consistently conservative justices as measured by their voting in 5-4 cases compared with less contested cases, although Clark and Harlan are among the most liberal of the conservative justices. Thomas emerges as the most consistently conservative because he votes conservative in a very high fraction of cases independent of the number of dissents in the case (85 percent with four dissents and 92 percent with one to three).
Among liberals, Stone, Frank Murphy and Fortas are the only ones whose ideological voting is the same in the 5-4 majority and cases with between one and three dissents. Unlike other liberals in our sample, Stone voted more conservatively in closely contested cases, although the difference is not statistically significant. Stone is also the most conservative of the liberal justices in closely contested cases and nearly three times more conservative than the next most liberal justice (Souter). Indeed, Stone looks more like a conservative (or moderate) than a liberal justice. He voted conservatively more often than liberals and even more so in closely contested cases.
Of the 10 moderates, five (Jackson, O'Connor, Powell, White and Frankfurter) vote significantly more conservatively and one (Blackmun) votes significantly less conservatively in the 5-4 cases, although the differences are relatively small (the average absolute difference is .10). These changes have no bearing on whether moderates are becoming more or less ideological but instead reflect a change in case mixture that leads moderates to vote more or less conservatively (the only options available). We also find that a significantly higher fraction of moderates than conservatives or liberals (40 percent versus 17 percent) vote the same in cases with between one and three dissents and 5-4 cases, where their vote in 5-4 cases would be more likely to be decisive rather than strategic. This might be thought implicit in "moderateness." But it need not be; a moderate justice might feel strongly enough about the outcome of a case to vote strategically, even if his reason for feeling strongly has nothing to do with ideology.
There are several noteworthy changes in rank between 5-4 cases and other cases. Among the current justices, Roberts ranks fourth in conservatism in 5-4 cases but only 22d in cases in which there are fewer than three dissents (though his decision in the Obamacare cases was a notable exception). Thus he is a reliable conservative in the most closely contested cases but moderate when his vote cannot change the outcome. This is consistent with a chief justice's interest in being on the winning side in most cases; otherwise it looks as if he cannot control his Court. On the liberal side, Sotomayor and Kagan are the fourth and sixth most liberal justices in 5-4 decisions but the 13th and 10th most liberal in other nonunanimous decisions. The mirror image of Roberts, they vote very liberally in 5-4 cases but are among the most conservative liberal justices in cases in which, because there are fewer than four dissenting votes, their votes cannot change the outcome. This makes them look moderate. A moderate image is attractive to many judges, owing to a general dislike of political judges.
Recall that in Table 1 we found that Rehnquist was less conservative (a statistically significant, though small, difference) after he became chief justice. Yet Table 2 reveals that he was equally conservative before and after he became chief justice in both 5-4 cases and cases that appeared on the front page of the New York Times (see Table 5 ). The implication of comparing the different results in the two tables is that he did not moderate his views when a conservative vote mattered to the outcome (5-4 cases and the Times sample, which has a disproportionate fraction of 5-4 cases) but moderated his views after he became chief justice in cases that were less controversial or less important. This would be consistent with his successor's behavior. Table 3 aggregates the votes of the justices into our three ideology groups. We find that conservatives are 5.4 times and moderates 4.2 times more likely to vote conservatively than liberals are in 5-4 cases. Not surprisingly, the differences are more muted in less contested cases (one to three dissents), in which conservatives vote about twice as conservatively and moderates 1.8 times as conservatively as liberals. We thus observe the statistical phenomenon of regression to the mean as the extremes move closer to the mean in the less contested cases. These findings are similar to those in our book, even though there we do not adjust the votes for differences in case mixture that affect the overall level of conservative voting.
It is worth noting a possible qualification to the hypothesis that ideology plays a bigger role in 5-4 dissents than in less closely divided cases.
13 Consider a Court of five conservative and four liberal justices (like the current Court) and assume that a justice's ideological preference does not vary from case to case, so he votes according to his ideology in cases in which ideology dominates nonideological considerations. Hence, in a 5-4 conservative decision (where nonideological factors are relatively unimportant), all five conservative justices will vote conservatively and all four liberals will vote liberally. Now assume a 6-3 conservative decision. Most likely, the five conservatives will vote conservatively, but only three of the four liberals will vote liberally-if all four voted liberally, the decision would be 5-4 rather than 6-3. We observe, therefore, a greater difference between conservatives and liberals in 5-4 than in 6-3 decisionsthe difference between conservatives and liberals is 100 percent in the former decisions but only 75 percent (100 − 25) in the latter ones. This example suggests that the opportunity to vote one's ideology (combined with the relative importance of nonideological factors) drives the finding that ideological differences between conservatives and liberals are greater 13. We thank William Hubbard for pointing out this qualification. in the more closely contested cases. Table 4 confirms this for cases in which the difference in the percentage of conservative votes between conservative and liberal justices (assuming that the Court consists of five conservatives and four liberals) is greatest for a 5-4 decision (either a conservative or liberal one) and diminishes as the fraction of dissents declines. There are two reasons, however, why the opportunity to vote one's ideology cannot account for the sharp increase in ideological voting that we observe in Table 3 . First, the calculations in Table 4 depend critically on the ideological makeup of the Court. If the Court consists of seven conservatives and two liberals instead of five conservatives and four liberals, the greatest ideological voting difference between conservatives and liberals occurs in 7-2 conservative decisions (conservatives vote 100 percent and liberals 0 percent for a conservative outcome), not a 5-4 decision (conservatives vote 71 percent and liberals 0 percent conservatively). To take another example, let the Court consist of three liberals, two conservatives and four moderates (which corresponds to the makeup of the Court in the 1972-86 terms) and assume that moderates are equally likely to vote for a conservative or liberal outcome. Then, in decisions that range from 6-3 conservative to 7-2 liberal (and thus includes both 5-4 conservative and 5-4 liberal decisions), both conservatives and liberals have the opportunity to vote their ideology. Conservatives vote 100 percent and liberals vote 0 percent conservatively, and so ideological differences are not magnified in 5-4 decisions. In short, the claim that the opportunity to vote one's ideology can explain that the finding in Table 3 is true only if the Court is made up of five conservatives (or liberals) and four liberals (or conservatives). Since this distribution holds only for the Note. C = conservative justice; L = liberal justice.
Roberts Court (which accounts for fewer than 7 percent of the votes in our sample), opportunities alone cannot explain why ideological voting differences are greater in 5-4 cases than in other cases. The notion that the opportunity to vote one's ideology can account for ideological differences in voting begs the question of why some cases are decided 5-4, 6-3 and so forth. It must be that nonideological factors weigh heavily in some cases. The fact that 5-4 decisions account for 27 percent, 6-3 for 13 percent, 7-2 for 14 percent, 8-1 for 8 percent and 9-0 for 38 percent of cases during John Roberts's terms shows that nonideological factors dominate ideological considerations in a majority of cases.
Our second effort at comparison of more and less significant cases involves 784 nonunanimous cases (and 6,861 votes in those cases) in the 1946-2012 terms in which the New York Times published a story about the Court's decision on its front page the day after the decision was issued. We find that the Times front page tends, as one expects, to cover the more hotly contested cases-33.4 percent were 5-4 decisions as opposed to 25.1 percent in cases in the 1946-2012 terms not covered in the Times sample. Table 5 presents the rankings of justices on the basis of their votes in the Times cases. As with our findings regarding 5-4 cases, we find that conservative justices voted more conservatively, moderates voted about the same and liberal justices voted less conservatively in Times cases relative to non-Times cases.
14 For example, conservatives voted for the conservative decision 86.9 percent of the time in Times cases versus 73.4 percent in non-Times cases, moderates voted 58.9 percent versus 62.3 percent for the conservative decision and liberals voted 17.8 percent versus 26.5 percent for the conservative decision. 15 Notice also the sharp drop in the fraction of conservative votes between the least conservative moderate (Blackmun) and the most conservative liberal (Black) in Times cases-Blackmun voted conservatively in 43.4 percent of the cases, and Black did so for 28.6 percent. We observe a similar result in 5-4 cases.
14. We do not report the non-Times cases in Table 5 , although note that ideology calculations in the non-Times cases are close to the numbers reported for all nonunanimous cases in Table 1 because Times cases account for 18 percent of all cases in the 1946-2012 terms.
15. We also estimated a regression for the 36 justices in which the dependent variable is the difference between the fraction of conservative votes in Times and non-Times cases and the independent variables are dummy variables denoting whether the justice is a conservative, moderate or liberal. (The excluded variable is the liberal dummy.) The regression coefficients on the conservative and moderate variables are both significant (t-ratios of 7.4 and 2.3, respectively) and significantly different from each other. Although the Times and 5-4 rankings are highly correlated (rankorder correlation of .88), there are several differences worth noting. As shown in Figure 3 , Minton, Fred Vinson and Stanley Forman Reed are the three most conservative justices in the Times sample but among the least conservative in 5-4 decisions. Burger and John Roberts go in the opposite direction. They are among the four most conservative in 5-4 cases but the five least conservative in Times cases. Clark is the least conservative of conservative justices in both the Times and 5-4 cases but votes conservatively about 26 percent more often in Times than in 5-4 cases. Warren is the most liberal justice in 5-4 cases but among the four most conservative liberal justices in Times cases. Table 6 presents rank-order correlations that summarize the relations between the different ideological rankings in Tables 1, 2 , and 5. Although the overall rankings based on both 5-4 and Times decisions are closely related to the ranking in all nonunanimous cases (Table 1) , the relation is closer for the 5-4 cases than for the Times cases (a rank correlation of .96 versus .85).
16 Some of this difference may be caused by the smaller sample 16. The two correlations are of the 36 justices in the Times sample. We noted earlier the correlation between 5-4 and all nonunanimous cases in the full sample of 41 justices (which includes justices who left the bench before the 1946 term). In addition to its smaller sample size, the measure strikes us as inferior to the other measures in this paper and in our book because those measures are based directly and exclusively on judicial behavior (the justices' votes, for example), whereas the Times measure is bound to be strongly influenced by strictly journalistic considerations, such as the interests and policy preferences of its readership, the interests and policy preferences of its owners and editors, the competition of other stories for first-page coverage and (relatedly) the capacity of the first page. Nevertheless, the significant correlation between the results we derive from that sample and the results from our other two samples provide some support for using Times front-page coverage as another proxy for the significance of a Supreme Court decision.
CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the two main criticisms made by Sunstein (2013) of the ideological rankings of justices in our book on federal judicial behavior. The first was that ranking justices who sat in different time periods is problematic because the justices faced a different mixture of cases. The second criticism questioned our implicit assumption that all (nonunanimous) cases are fungible for the purpose of calculating a justice's ideology. In response to the first criticism, we created a conservative price index that uses the votes of moderate justices in each term to adjust for changes in case mixture that affect how a justice votes, independent of changes in ideology. We deflated the votes of each justice by this price index to create an adjusted or real fraction of conservative votes that allows us to compare justices who sat on the Court in different time periods. We responded to Sunstein's second criticism by focusing on the adjusted rankings of justices in the more hotly contested cases and comparing these results to the rankings in all nonunanimous cases. Both adjustments result in only minor changes in the rankings we presented in Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2013) , but the changes should be interesting to anyone analyzing the behavior of an individual justice.
APPENDIX: ATTIDUDINAL MODEL OF JUDGING
That 5-4 decisions are more ideologically divisive than most Supreme Court decisions is a basic premise of many social science theories of judicial behavior. For example, the widely used attitudinal model assumes that both the facts of cases and the justices' policy preferences can be ordered along a single ideological dimension (see, for example, Schubert 1965; Segal and Spaeth 2002) . Figure A1 provides an example. There we show three justices (liberal, moderate and conservative) and three search-and-seizure cases (from extremely protective of individual rights to extremely intrusive). Under the attitudinal approach, justices vote to uphold all searches to their left. Thus, all three justices will vote to permit the search in the extremely protective case (case 1); even the liberal justice can see that the police followed all the rules. And all three will vote against the search in the extremely intrusive case (case 3); even the conservative justice recognizes that the police disregarded the rules. Cases 1 and 3 are easy cases that create no dissent. Only in the hard case (case 2) does ideological divisiveness occur and lead to a split decision supporting the search (example adapted from Spaeth [1995] ). 
